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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
Skinner's responsive brief does not deny the jurisdictional defect associated with

the location of the easement. Instead, Skimler's brief presents a series of diversions and
distractions that attempt to obscure the simple reality of this case, which is the partially
illegal attempt of the parties' predecessors in interest to give something that they did not
have - namely, an easement over the State's right-of-way.
Notwithstanding Skinner's diversions and distractions to the contrary, the fact of
the matter is that the status quo cannot be maintained. Practically speaking, the Plane
Trust's parcel is effectively landlocked by the jurisdictional defect to which Skinner is
unilaterally applying to limit the location of the easement to only 5-feet on the "west
border" of Parcel #2 (and even something "less" on Parcel #1), as opposed to the lO-feet
on the "west border" of these Parcels. While Skinner speaks of the lTD permit they
obtained without any consultation with the Plane Trust - which may suggest the use of 5feet upon the State's right-of-way - Skinner must nonetheless acknowledge that the lTD
permit is revocable. Even Skinner must therefore agree that the permit itself does not
permanently allow 5-feet upon the right-of-way, but reserves in the State the authority for
it to be smaller due to other authorized encroachments in the right-of-way, like the power
pole. This means that should the District Court's 2013 Decision be allowed to stand, the

parcel's de facto landlocked status will be officially made landlocked de jure. Thus, both
as a matter of law and common sense, the current state of affairs cannot be maintained.
The Plane Trust's claim for relief is premised upon some of the most elemental
principles oflaw, including this Court's well-established precedent that contracts are
unenforceable to the extent that they are illegal, that public policy will not suffer the
existence of a landlocked parcel, and -.:. most conspicuously of all - that one cannot give
what one does not own. Beneath the various red herrings and distortions proffered by
Skinner, the long and short of this case is that an easement must exist to provide access to
the Plane Trust's parcel.
Although this easement could be established by implication as a last resort, by far
the most direct way to achieve this legally necessary result is to redact the offending
language in the express grant of an easement over Skinner's property contained in the
2000 Judgment so as to render it entirely legal and valid as per the Plane Trust's original
60(b)(4) motion. The Plane Trust therefore respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the District Court's holding and grant the appellant's motion to partially void the 2000
Judgment.

II.

Course of Proceedings.

See Opening Br. at 4-8.

III
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III.

Statement of Facts.
Skinner makes several misstatements of fact.
To begin with, Skinner repeatedly speaks to the Plane Trust's "dissatisfaction"

over being saddled with a partially illegal easement and speculates about the Plane
Trust's concern that this "reduced the marketability and value of the property." Skinner's

Br. at 5, 6, 10 n.20, 11,30-32. Skinner does not represent the Plane Trust and has no
authority to know the latter's motivations or beliefs, though it should not be a surprise to
anybody that "value" of property is important, even to Skinner, given Jason Skinner's
averment on the point in his affidavit. See R. Vol. II, p. 301. Moreover, Skinner's
repeated statement that lTD had granted "permission from the State authorizing what had
been the historic use of the right-of-way"l ignores the fact that Skinner never consulted
with the Plane Trust about the lTD permit before it was issued and ignores the fact that
the lTD permit is revocable. See Skinner's Br. at 6, lO; R. Vol. II, p. 334.
However, the most egregious misstatement of fact is Skinner's contention that the
original parties to the 2000 Stipulation "agreed that the entire historical ten-foot width of
[the] driveway would not be located on either Everton property [sic] and the Wallentine
property." Skinner's Br. at 8 (emphasis in original). This is patently false. The parties'

1 In addition, Skinner's continual reference to the "historic use" of the right-of-way is ambiguous
and misleading since Skinner must agree that the permit description and Skinner's diagram are
inconsistent with each other and describe two different routes for accessing the impacted parcels.
Compare R. Vol. II, pp. 305-306 with R. Vol. II, p. 315.
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predecessors in interest expressly granted an easement of approximately ten feet to the
MacVicar property (Parcel #3) upon the "west border" of the Everton property (Parcel
#1) and the Wallentine property (Parcel #2). The easement explicitly stated:
There is granted to Jeanne MacVicar [then the owner of Parcel #3] by
Annette and Sterling Wallentine [then the owner of Parcel #2], and Peggy
and David Everton [then the owner of Parcel #1] ... an easement of
approximately ten (10) feet in width for egress and ingress to their
property, said easement being located on the west border of said
properties.
R. Vol. I, p. 197, paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment (emphasis added).
The problem is that the foregoing easement language went on to oddly create
another (illegal) option for providing this ten foot easement, stating:
The easement shall not exceed its present width where it adjoins the
Everton property. No more [than] five feet of the Wallentine property shall
be used as part of the easement, and only that portion of the Wallentine
property as necessary to provide ten (10) feet in width shall be used .... It is
understood that the existing right-of-way leading from the State right of
way to the Everton, Wallentine and Macvicar properties may be located, in
part, upon the State right-of-way as historically has been so used.
R. Vol. I, p. 197, paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment (emphasis added).

Either the ten foot easement could (legally) lie in its entirety across the "west
border" of the private land (Parcels # 1 and #2), or the ten foot easement could (illegally)
straddle the private property and the State's right-on-way on the "west border" of Parcels
#1 and #2. That is, it was entirely contemplated by the original parties that this ten foot
easement would be located entirely on the "west border" of the private property of the
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servient estate( s). The point of the Plane Trust's 60(b)(4) motion - as agreed to by all
parties (as well as lTD) with the exception ofSkiImer, R. Vol. II, pp. 257-258 - was that
it was necessary to void the plainly illegal option purporting to create the easement
straddling a mixture of private land and State right-of-way since the only legal,
enforceable option of providing the ten foot easement was to do so wholly across the
"west border" of the private land in Parcels # 1 and #2. Thus, it is disingenuous of Skinner
to quote the easement language as providing that "[n]o more than five feet of the
Wallentine Property shall be used as a part of the easement," Skininer's Br. at 8, while
conspicuously omitting the rest of that sentence, which further grants "that portion of the
Wallentine property as necessary to provide ten (10) feet in width shall be used." R. Vol.
I, p. 197.2
Skinner's consistent refusal to admit that the parties' predecessors in interest
contemplated creating the ten foot easement entirely across private land forces Skinner to
ignore the plain language of the grant. Though admittedly strange, it is clear that the
location of the easement was intended to be one of the two alternatives described above:

It is understood that the existing right-of-way leading from the State right
of way to the Everton, Wallentine, and Macvicar properties may be
located, in part, upon the State right-of-way as historically has been so
used.
It is also disingenuous to claim that "[a]s would be expected, the Stipulated Judgment was not
appealed." Skinner's Br. at 9. ITO was not in a position to appeal because it was not a party to
the 2000 Judgment and had no knowledge of it until 2013. See R. Vol. I, pp. 220, 238.
2
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R. Vol. I, p. 188 (emphasis added). The original parties' use of the word "may" (as
opposed to "shall" or "would") is of critical significance because it confirms this
alternative arrangement, as pointed out by the Plane Trust and erroneously misstated by
the District Court. See Opening Br. at 27-29. Skinner therefore deliberately ignores the
plain language of the easement when it asserts that "the width of the driveway would lie
partially upon [private] properties and partially upon the State's right-of-way," seeing as
the easement language specifically says that it only "may be" so located. Skinner's Br. at
5 (emphasis added).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Skinner asserts that the denial of a motion to void a judgment for lack of
jurisdiction under Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(4) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Skinner's Br. at 16. This is incorrect. Jurisdictional defects alleged in a 60(b)(4) motion
are reviewed de novo because they are a question of law, 'and "this Court exercises free
review over questions oflaw." Kootenai Medical Ctr. v. Idaho Dep't o/Health and

Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 876, 216 P.3d 630,634 (2009).
The confusion over the proper standard of review fostered here by Skinner stems
from the fact that Rule 60(b) in general offers a multitude of different types of relief,
most of which are discretionary. However, motions to void ajudgment for lack of
jurisdiction under 60(b)(4) present a purely legal question that warrants no additional
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deference to a trial court's findings. This rule has been well established at the Court of
Appeals level for nearly two decades. See McClure Engineering, Inc. v. Channel 5

KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, 155 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Relief from a void
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) is nondiscretionary and is subject to free review on
appeal.") (citing Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 372
(Ct.App.1998)). This freedom of appellate review is premised upon the nondiscretionary nature of motions to void for jurisdictional defects under 60(b)(4). McClure

Engineering, at 953, 1192. (citing Fisher Systems Leasing, Inc. v. J & J Gunsmithing &
Weaponry Design, Inc., 135 Idaho 624, 627,21 P.3d 946, 949 (Ct.App.2001». The
Court of Appeals has even noted that using an abuse of discretion standard of review in
the context of voiding a jurisdictionally defective judgment under 60(b)(4) could easily
lead to absurd results because it "could lead to the untenable result of a court determining
that it lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction, and yet, in its discretion,
enforcing a void judgment." Dragotoiu at 647,372, n. 2.
This consistent line of reasoning from the Court of Appeals reflects Supreme
Court precedent requiring de novo review for questions of law. See e.g., Idaho Historic

Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council o/City o/Boise, 134 Idaho 651,654,8 P.3d
646,649 (2000). Nevertheless, Skinner latches on to two cases in an attempt to confuse
this issue.

7

Skinner first cites to Meyers v.

Hansen~

148 Idaho 283~ 221 P.3d 81 (2008), for the

proposition that "an abuse of discretion standard will be applied to [a] district court's
denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion." Skinner's Br. at 16. This is incorrect. First, the Court
in Meyers did not make that specific holding. Second, Meyers analyzed a Rule 60(b)(4)
motion in the context of a claim of deficient notice under Idaho R. Civ. Pro.
is a factual

finding~

55(c)~

which

not a legal finding. Id. at 287~ 85. On the contrary, the Court in

Meyers specifically noted that/actual findings - including the motion to void (under

60(b)(4)) for insufficient notice (under 55( c)) - is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
while simultaneously noting that the Court exercised de novo review over questions of
law. Meyers at 287,85. (citing McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621,

623 (2004) and Kootenai Medical Ctr. v. Idaho Dep't o/Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho
872,876,216 P.3d 630, 634 (2009)). Thus, because the 60(b)(4) motion presented a
factual issue instead of a legal issue - as this case does - a different standard of review
was warranted.
Skinner also cites Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 726, 152
P .3d 594, 597 (2007), for the same claim. But Blimka is similarly inappropriate here
under the explanation just provided. Blimka concerned a/actual question of whether an
out of state defendant fell within the scope of Idaho's long-arm statute. Id. Similarly,
Blimka only spoke to "60(b) motions" generally, not 60(b)(4) motions in particular.
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Moreover, Blimka's generic conclusion that "relief under the provisions ofIdaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) is [] discretionary" did not specifically discuss a 60(b )(4) motion to
void a judgment for lack of jurisdiction, but rather upon a prior case that dealt with a
motion to reconsider. ld. (citing Watson v. Navistar Int'l. transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643,
651,827 P.2d 656,664 (1992)).
Thus, neither Meyers nor Blimka supports Skinner's theory that motions to void a
jurisdictionally defective judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion because those cases only presented factual questions and did not address the
specific circumstance presented here. In contrast, in this instant case, the purely legal
question of whether the District Court had the power to regulate the State's rights-of-way
in place of lTD merits de novo review precisely as this Court has consistently held with
regards to questions of pure law. This conclusion is consistent with this Court's own
treatment of Rule 60(b)(4) motions elsewhere. See e.g., Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,
212 P.3d 1001 (2009) (reviewing motions under Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(1), (5), and (6)
under an abuse of discretion standard, but reserving judgment on whether appellants were
"entitled to relief as a matter o/law" under 60(b)(4)) (emphasis added).3

This necessarily applies to contracts such as the easement created in the 2000 StipUlation. See
Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 608, 200 P.3d 1153, 1157 (2009):
3

Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from
all the facts and circumstances of each case. Trees v. Kersey, l38 Idaho 3, 6, 56
P.3d 765, 768 (2002). The illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in

9

In addition to the uniform line of reasoning supporting de novo review presented
by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, de novo review of a 60(b)(4)
motion in this circumstance tracks the identical federal rule for voiding a motion for
jurisdictional deficiency. The federal Circuit courts collectively agree that "de novo
review of Rule 60(b)(4) challenges is warranted because a district court's failure to vacate
a void judgment is per se an abuse ofdiscretion." Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora,

S.A., 558 F.3d 1210 (lIth Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (citing Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d
1000, 1005 (5th Cir.1998) ("Rule 60(b)(4) motions leave no margin for consideration of
the district court's discretion"); see also In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d. 1440,
1447-1448 (9th Cir. 1985).4 Given the parity between the federal and Idaho rules of civil

litigation. Id. In fact, the court has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua
sponte. Id. While this Court is bound by the district court's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous, it is not bound by the district court's conclusions of
law, and may draw its own conclusions from the facts presented. Griffith v. Clear
Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 737, 152 P.3d 604, 608 (2007). Thus, we freely
review whether or not the contract in this case was illegal.
4

See also Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (lIth Cir. 2001):
However, "[u]nlike motions pursuant to other subsections of Rule 60(b), Rule
60(b)(4) motions leave no margin for consideration of the district court's
discretion as the judgments themselves are by definition either legal nullities or
not." Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir.1998). Therefore, "[w]e
review de novo ... a district court's ruling upon a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside
a judgment as void, because the question of the validity of a judgment is a legal
one." Export Group v. ReefIndus., Inc., 54 F3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir.1995); see
also Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir.1987) ("[T]here
is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule
60(b)(4).") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

lO

procedure, the Idaho Court of Appeals has acknowledged the non-discretionary nature of
relief afforded by a motion to void under Rule 60(b)(4). Dragotoiu at 647, 372, n. 2
(citing Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional De Produccion De Costa Rica, 614
F .2d 1247, 1256 (9th Cir.1980) and 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., WRIGHT MILLER &
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2862, at 322 (2d ed. 1995) ("There is no
question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under [federal] Rule
60(b)(4).").
As a result of the uniform de novo review afforded to pure questions oflaw
including motions to void under Rule 60(b)(4), stare decisis does not require that this
Court "overturn" the prior decades of Court of Appeals decisions, as Skinner requests.

Skinner's Br. at 16. Rather, if anything, this Court should simply confirm its prior
position that, although most forms of relief provided Rule 60(b) are discretionary,
questions of law presented under 60(b)(4) are reviewed de novo.s

ARGUMENT
This case concerns a very simple legal error: the partially illegal attempt of the
parties' predecessors in interest to give something that they did not have - namely, an
easement over the State's right-of-way. This essential simplicity has been consistently
obscured and confused by erroneous judicial confmnation on multiple occasions. Now,
5 This standard of review argument was similarly entwined with Skinner's irrelevant "timeliness"
argument presented both here and below. See R. Vol. II, pp. 352-54.

II

Skimler elevates this confusion to a new level by asserting numerous false complexities
that serve only to further mislead the proper inquiry of this case.
The Court should not be distracted by this ploy. Every court, including this Court,
has a sua sponte duty to question the legality of a contract at any time. Farrell v.

Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,608,200 P.3d 1153, 1157 (2009). The instant appeal presents
such an occasion. As such, the various arguments put forth by Skinner about (among
other things) timeliness, waiver, joinder, voidability, notice, and nonsensical speculations
about the Plane Trust's personal motives are simply smokescreens which obscure what is
at bottom a very simple legal error contained in paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment and
paragraph 6 of the 2000 Stipulation.
This Court should therefore fmd in the Plane Trust's favor because both the
District Court and the parties' predecessors in interest exercised a power they did not
have and thereby created a contract that was, at least in part, void ab initio.
I.

Skinner does not rebut - and therefore concedes - the crux of the entire case:
the Plane Trust's argument that paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment violates
the basic common law principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
The Plane Trust's opening brief stated the elementary proposition that "no one can

convey what he does not own." Opening Br. at 19 (citing Charles Harpum, et al., The

Law o/Real Property 86 (8th ed., 2012». The impacted right-of-way at issue in this case
is owned by the State ofIdaho as administered by the Idaho Transportation Department.
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Opening Br. at 19. (citing I.e. § 40-117(9) (defining public right-of-way as including
"fee simple title")). In attempting to create an easement partially overlapping this State
right-of-way, the original private parties to the 2000 Stipulation thereby attempted to
"give away" something which they did not own because the State owns the right-of-way,
not any private citizen. Therefore, the 2000 Stipulation (and the 2000 Judgment which
confrrrned it) was illegal in this regard. That is the essence of this case.
Astonishingly, Skinner's response says nothing about the violation of this basic
but fundamental common law rule. Skinner's silence on this crucial point can therefore
only be taken as an implicit admission that the Plane Trust's underlying claim is correct.
Indeed, instead of trying to challenge the substance of the Plane Trust's claim, Skinner
only puts forth various technical excuses without ever addressing the violation of the
nemo dat non quod habet rule. The weakness and irrelevance of these proffered excuses
is discussed below in Section II.

II.

Skinner's various attempts to justify the violation of the nemo dat non quod
habet rule are unpersuasive, if not irrelevant, and only serve to further
confuse the real issue in this case.
Since Skinner implicitly admits that the offending language in paragraph 5 of the

2000 Judgment and in paragraph 6 of the 2000 Stipulation violates the nemo dat rule
described above, the best it can hope to do is sweep this substantive deficiency under the
procedural rug. To this end, Skinner creates a smokescreen of alleged procedural errors

13

in the Plane Trust's claim, ranging from alleged issues of timeliness and waiver to the
rules of joinder. These "technicalities" are meritless and beside the point. As described
below, Skinner's various procedural tangents6 do nothing to excuse the inherent
substantive invalidity of the offending language of the easement.

A. Skinner's assertion that the Plane Trust's original Rule 60(b)(4)
motion was untimely is unfounded because it ignores this Court's sua
sponte duty to inquire into the legality of contracts and the centuriesold common law principle that judgments rendered without
jurisdiction are void. 7
Skinner begins by asserting that the Plane Trust's originaI60(b)(4) motion was
untimely because all such motions can only be brought within a "reasonable" time. But
this Court's precedent makes clear that a void judgment may be challenged at any time
because such judgments are nullities and were never enforceable to begin with.
As stated previously, this Court recognizes that it has "the duty to raise the issue of
illegality sua sponte." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,608,200 P.3d 1153, 1157
(2009) (emphasis added); see Opening Br. at 24. Contracts are unenforceable to the
6 Implicit within every mention of some alleged procedural technicality is Skinner's
dissimulating attempt to confuse a void contract with a voidable contract. This case deals with a
contract that is already void (at least in part), not with a contract that could become void. As
described in Section I above, the offending portion of paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment and of
paragraph 6 of 2000 Stipulation was void ab initio. Because a reviewing court itself has the duty
to question a contract's legality at any time, it is disingenuous for Skinner to place a non-existent
burden on the Plane Trust of demonstrating the illegality of paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment
within certain procedural frameworks.
7

This corresponds with Section I of Skinner's Argument. Skinner's Br. at 17-19.
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extent that they are illegal. Farrell at 609, 1158. There is no question that "an illegal
contract is void." AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159,

,307 P.3d 176,

184 (2013). Moreover, "a void judgment can be attacked at any time by any person
adversely affected by it." Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 809, _, 277 P.3d 337,341
(2012) (emphasis added).8 Consequently, to demonstrate the validity of its original
60(b)(4) motion, the Plane Trust cited to Burns v. Baldwin in its opening brief for the
proposition that "[a] judgment of a court without jurisdiction is void, and void judgments
may be attacked at any time." 138 Idaho 480,486,65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003); see Opening

Br. at 17, n.2.
However, Skinner takes issue with the Plane Trust's reliance on Burns, saying it is
"inapplicable because it was discussing California law only." Skinner's Br. at 17. This is
disingenuous; Burns involved a default judgment rendered in California, but the
controlling law relied upon by the Plane Trust was not at all isolated to that forum. In
reality, the portion of Burns quoted above relied upon a famous U.S. Supreme Court case
for that proposition. See Burns at 486, 508 (citing Burnham v. Superior Court of

California, County ofMarin, 495 U.S. 604,608-09 (1990)). Burnham is particularly

Cuevas also refutes Skinner's repeated assertion that a motion to void for lack of jurisdiction
under Rule 60(b)(4) must be brought within a "reasonable" time. Skinner's Br. at 17. The Plane
Trust also already refuted this erroneous imposition of a time limit in its pleadings before the
District Court. See R. Vol. II, pp. 352-354.
8
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relevant here because it makes plain how ancient and well-established the principle is that
jurisdictional defects render a decision void:
The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is
void traces back to the English Year Books, see Bowser v. Collins,
Y.B.Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pI. 11, 145 Eng.Rep. 97 (1482), and was made
settled law by Lord Coke in Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Co.Rep. 68b, 77
Eng.Rep. 1027, 1041 (K.B. 1612). Traditionally that proposition was
embodied in the phrase coram non judice, -- "before a person not ajudge" - meaning, in effect, that the proceeding in question was not a judicial
proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present, and
could therefore not yield a judgment. American courts invalidated, or
denied recognition to, judgments that violated this common law
principle long before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. See,
e.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.Cas.
609 (No. 11, 134) (CC Mass. 1828); Dunn v. Dunn,4 Paige 425 (N.Y.Ch.
1834); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273 (1835); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Sergo
447 (Pa.1844); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 350 (1850). In
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878), [110 S.Ct. 2110] we announced
that the judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
Burnham at 608-09. (emphasis added). Thus, instead of citing to some supposedly
irrelevant "California law," as Skinner asserts, the Plane Trust was citing to binding U.S.
Supreme Court precedent which, in tum, was premised upon a tenet of Anglo-American
jurisprudence so fundamental that it was already recognized as axiomatic before
Columbus discovered the New World.
Accordingly, the jurisdictional defect contained in paragraph 5 ofthe 2000
Judgment and in paragraph 6 of the 2000 Stipulation - the erroneous judicial
confIrmation of the equally erroneous attempt of the parties' predecessors in interest to
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"give what they did not own" with regard to the State's right-of-way - rendered the
judgment void ab initio. Skinner can only deny this by denying 500 year old binding
common law precedent as well as this Court's own sua sponte duty to determine the
legality of contracts such as the 2000 Stipulation. The error of Skinner's argument could
not be more clear.
B. It is impossible to "waive" a jurisdictional defect and the rules of
joinder are not relevant here.9
Skinner tries in vain to make something of the fact that lTD was never a party to
this litigation. Skinner first argues that the Plane Trust somehow "waived" their ability to
litigate the jurisdictional defect because their predecessors in interest, the MacVicars,
"decided not to name the State ofIdaho as a party" to the 2000 Stipulation and 2000
Judgment. Skinner's Br. at 20. Skinner cites no legal authority for the proposition that
"the Planes are bound by this decision of their predecessors in interest," id., which is
because no such authority exists. As described above in Section ILA, this Court's sua

sponte duty to inquire into the legality of a contract, the fact that illegal contracts are
necessarily void, and the ability of any party to attack a void judgment at any time all
conclusively demonstrate the absurdity of any such "waiver" claim. The Court should
reject this "argument" without any further ado.

9

This corresponds with Sections II and III of Skinner's Argument. Skinner's Br. at 19-22.
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Skinner next argues that the Plane Trust is barred from litigating the jurisdictional
defect because it did not join lTD as a party under Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 19(a). Neither the
Plane Trust in its 60(b)(4) motion nor the District Court in its various rulings ever
discussed the issue of joinder. Instead, Skinner argued this for the first time on appeal,
meaning that under the precedent Skinner themselves cite elsewhere, Skinner is
precluded from making this argument now. See Skinner's Br. at 24, 29 (citing
Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861,866,136 P.3d 322, 337

(2006)).
More to the point, however, the Plane Trust already explained why the rules of
joinder are not applicable in this case in its Response to Order a/the Supreme Court
dated October 24, 2013 fIled November 12, 2013. There, the Plane Trust explained that

it was not "asserting a procedural claim about the equities of the case," which the rules of
joinder under Rule 19(a) seek to protect, but was instead "assert[ing] a substantive claim
to remedy the legal error contained in the 2000 Judgment." Id. at 25-28. Evidently this
argument was at least somewhat persuasive as the Court subsequently reinstated the
appeal in its Order to Withdraw Order Dated October 24, 2013 and Reinstate Appellate
Proceedings, Docket No. 41448-2013 (12-3-2013). In reality, just like the so-called

"waiver" issue, the issue of joinder is yet another red herring put forth by Skinner to
divert the focus of this case, which is the Court's sua sponte duty to assess the illegality
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of the 2000 Judgment as described in Section ILA above. The Court should therefore
disregard this contention for the same reason.

C. Skinner's arguments about Title 40 of the Idaho Code are entirely
irrelevant and in fact only serve as a concession that 2000 Stipulation
and 2000 Judgment were partially illegal. 10
Skinner misunderstands and mischaracterizes the Plane Trust's reference to Title
40 of the Idaho Code. In fact, Skinner's purported counter-arguments only serve to
reinforce the point the Plane Trust was trying to make all along, which is that paragraph 5
of the 2000 Judgment is jurisdictionally defective. As such, Skinner's arguments refute
themselves.
Skinner argues that the 2000 Judgment and 2000 Stipulation "did not 'give away'
any ofthe State's property rights to a third party" and did not "divest" or "result in an
'abandonment' of the State's right-of-way." Skinner's Br. at 22. However, how can
Skinner make these arguments when Skinner states in another part of their responsive
brief that:
In the Stipulation for Settlement, the parties expressly acknowledged that
the remaining width ofthe driveway would still cross the State's right-ofway along the unimproved edge ofState Highway 89, "as historically has
been used."
Skinner's Br. at 8 (emphasis added). Indeed, the application of the 2000 Judgment and
2000 Stipulation by Skinner (and by the District Court) did intend to divest the State of a
10

This corresponds with Sections IV and V of Skinner's Argument. Skinner's Br. at 22-25.
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portion of its right-of-way. The entire point ofthis litigation was the contracting parties likely innocently, but certainly illegally - intended to effect this divestment, as Skinners
themselves "acknowledge." Skinner's Br. at 8. See also Opening Br., at 23-24. The basis
for the present appeal is the District Court's consistent failure to recognize that such an
effect was inherently void in relevant part, thereby giving effect to that which was never
enforceable.
At its core, this is what precipitated the chain of events leading to this matter
before the Court. In 2012, lTD pursued enforcement actions against Skinner to abate an
"illegal encroachment" upon the State's right-of-way. See Opening Br. at 5-6 (citing R.
Vol. I, pp. 189-190,220,238). In response to this action by lTD (and recent actions by
Skinner to limit the location of the easement to just 5-feet on the "west border" of
Skinner's property), the Plane Trust filed its 60(b)(4) motion; the Trust sought to void the
language in the easement to redact any implication and reference to the State's right-ofway and to give effect to the 10-foot easement that was granted upon the "west border" of
Skinner's property, i.e. Parcels #1 and #2. lTD agreed with the Trust in its support of the
60(b)(4) motion, stating that the "modifications to the Court's Judgment and Decree for
Quiet Title you propose seem to address (at least in part) this issue" adding that the
"Department states that it has no objection to either the modifications you will present to
the Court." R. Vol. I, p. 238.
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The whole point of mentioning the various statutory provisions contained in Title
40 - which Skinner misses - is that the Idaho Legislature specifically granted exclusive
ownership and jurisdiction over the state's highways and rights-of-way to lTD. See

Opening Br. at 20-23 (citing, inter alia, LC. §§ 40-117(9), 201, 203, 203A, and 208(7)11).
The entire reference to Title 40 was just another way to state the obvious: neither the
private parties to the 2000 Stipulation nor the District Court in the 2000 Judgment had
any authority to create an easement across the State's right-of-way without the State's
consent and appropriate administrative action. Of course, the private parties and the
District Court attempted to create such an easement, but, as both Skinner and the Plane
Trust agree, this attempt was plainly illegaL See R. VoL II, pp. 349-350; see also R. VoL
I, pp. 220,238. Again, this is why the Plane Trust filed a 60(b)(4) motion to void the
offending portions of paragraph 5 as being void ab initio. But the insanity of this case is
that Skinner acknowledges that this purported easement upon the State's right-of-way
was iIlegal 12 yet nonetheless insists that it be enforced.

Skinner separately attacks the applicability ofLC. § 40-208(7). See Skinner's Br. at 24-25.
This separate treatment is simply a further distraction. Skinner's argument makes it seem as
though the Plane Trust is suing on behalf of the agency for a statutory violation. But of course
this is not the case. All of the Plane Trust's references relating to Title 40 ofthe Idaho Code
simply serve to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction on behalf of the private parties in the 2000
Stipulation and the District Court in the 2000 Judgment.
II

12 Skinner specifically admitted that the attempt to create an easement over State right-of-way
was illegal in its application for a permit from ITD. See R. Vol. II, p. 303 (requesting an
encroachment permit so as to "make road access appropriate and [egaf') (emphasis added).
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Since Skinner concedes that lTD has always had exclusive jurisdiction over the
impacted right-of-way and that it would be impossible for any other party to divest the
State of its property rights, this in itself is dispositive for ruling in favor of the Plane
Trust's original 60(b)(4) motion. Skinner's arguments about Title 40 are irrelevant and
without merit.

D. Paragraph 6 of the 2000 Stipulation is invalid for the same reasons and
to the same extent that paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment is invalid. 13
Skinner also makes the claim that the 2000 Stipulation would still be valid and
binding even if this Court found that paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment was illegal.

Skinner's Br. at 25-26. This is nonsense. Paragraph 6 of the 2000 Stipulation is
erroneous for the exact same reasons that paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment is erroneous:
it purports to locate an easement between two private parties partially over State right-ofway without the State's consent. As described above in Sections II.A and II.C (and
indeed throughout this entire litigation), neither the private parties to the 2000 Stipulation
nor the District Court in the 2000 Judgment had any power to remove any sticks from the
State of Idaho's proverbial bundle.
Still, Skinner argues that settlements such as the 2000 Stipulation should only be
"disregarded for the strongest of reasons." Skinner's Br. at 26 (citing Robert Comstock,

13

This corresponds with Section VI of Skinner's Argument. Skinner's Br. at 25-27.
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LLC v. KeyBank Nat 'I Assoc., 142 Idaho 568, 571-72, 130 P.3d 1106, 1109-110 (2006)).
Presumably, such a strong reason would be this Court's well-established binding
precedent that "[n]o principle in law [] is better settled than that which [] refuses redress
to either party to an illegal contract." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,608,200 P.3d
1153,1157 (2009) (citing McShane v. Quillin, 47 Idaho 542, 547, 277 P. 554,559
(1929)). Another strong reason would be paragraph 6 of the 2000 Stipulation's glaring
violation of the black letter law of nemo dat non quod habet so often repeated by the
Plane Trust and so conspicuously ignored by Skinner. See Section I supra.
The illegal provisions of a contract are no more valid than their erroneous judicial
conftrmation. See Opening Br. at 19. Accordingly, the Court should recognize Skinner's
diversionary tactic for what it is and fmd the 2000 Stipulation partially illegal for the
same reasons that the 2000 Judgment is partially illegal.

E. Skinner's "all or nothing" argument that the objectionable portions of
paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment are not severable forces them to
argue that an illegal contract must be enforced. 14
After admitting that the attempt of the contracting parties to create an easement
partially overlying the State's right-of-way was illegal (see footnote 12), Skinner then
goes on to argue that these illegal portions nevertheless cannot be severed from the
overall language of paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment.
14

This corresponds with Sections VII and VIII of Skinner's Argument. Skinner's Br. at 27-30.

23

To this end, Skinner relies on McGrew v. McGrew for the proposition that the
Plane Trust may not "unilaterally craft" a new, legally valid version of paragraph 5
because doing so would "contravene a material provision of the parties' settlement
agreement to limit the encroachment of the driveway to no more than five feet" of the
servient estate. Skinner's Br. at 27-28 (citing 139 Idaho 551, 559, 82 P.3d 833,841
(2003).15 Therefore, Skinner advances an all-or-nothing approach to paragraph 5, but
concludes that the entirety ofthe easement language must remain in place - even though
Skinner admits that it is partially illegal - because the Plane Trust did not seek to void the
entirety of paragraph 5 in its Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Id. at 28-29.
This all-or-nothing argument is inaccurate and unpersuasive. To begin with, it is
irrelevant that the Plane Trust only requested that paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment be
partially voided. As described in Section ILA, this Court is fully empowered (and indeed
obliged) to void whatever language in paragraph 5 it finds to be illegal, whether that be in
part or in whole. This is why the Plane Trust argued on appeal that as an unnecessarily
roundabout but nonetheless valid alternative to partially voiding the requested portions of
paragraph 5, this Court should void the entire paragraph and remand the case to the
15 It is ironic to say the least that Skinner professes such concern for the intention ofthe parties
with regard to the severability of parts of paragraph 5 and yet simply brushes aside the District
Court's erroneous assertion that the easement "would be" located on the State's right-of-way
when the plain language of paragraph 5 clearly states that it only "may be" so located. Skinner's
Br. at 23 n. 54. The Plane Trust pointed out this additional error at length in its opening brief. See
Opening Br. at 27-29. Skinner did not take issue with this point in their Responsive Brief.
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District Court to detemline the existence of an easement by implication instead of by
express grant. 16 See Opening Br. at 30-31 (citing R. VoL I, p. 74 and describing
altemative bases for the easement in question). By its own precedent, this Court is
obliged to determine the extent of the jurisdictional defect in paragraph 5 and eliminate it
accordingly. See Section ILA supra (citing Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 608,
200 P.3d 1153, 1157 (2009) and Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508
(2003)).
More to the point, however, Skinner's all-or-nothing approach is not warranted
because the illegal portions of paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment are severable from the
remaining, valid easement language. As explained before, paragraph 6 of the 2000
Stipulation and paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment expressly granted an easement of
"approximately ten (10) feet in width for egress and ingress" to Parcel #3 -- which is now
owned by the Plane Trust -- "on the west border" of Parcels # 1 and #2 -- which are now
owned by Skinner. R. VoL I, pp. 161,206,227. Strangely, the location ofthe easement
was defmed by two alternative choices, one legal and the other illegal: either the ten feet
could be (legally) provided across wholly private land, or the ten feet could be (illegally)

16 Skinner again claims that the Plane Trust is not allowed to make this argument on appeal
because it did not seek to void the entirety of paragraph 5 in its original Rule 60(b)(4) motion.
Skinner's Br. at 29-30 (citing Mountain Landowners Coop. Ass'n. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 866,
136 P.3d 322,337 (2006)). Yet again, Skinner ignores this Court's binding precedent and
rehashes its so-called procedural arguments in an attempt to divert the proper focus of inquiry
here. See Section ILA supra.
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provided across a mixture of public and private land, essentially straddling the State's
right-of-way. Thus, the Court can (and should) void the illegal option of straddling State
and private land while retaining the legal option of providing an easement of
approximately ten feet across the "west border" of the private land. This is what the
Plane Trust's 60(b)(4) Motion sought to accomplish. R. Vol. I, p. 227. Moreover, except
for Skinner, all parties to the case as well as lTD agreed to this approach. R. Vol. II, pp.
257-258.
As such, Skinner's argument that voiding only a portion of paragraph 5 of the
2000 Judgment would "contravene a material portion" that sought to limit the easement
to only five feet of private land is irrelevant: the "material portion" in question must be
contravened because it is illegal and unenforceable. Moreover, being thus unenforceable,
giving effect to the illegal portion of paragraph 5 thereby thwarts its overall purpose of
providing an easement of "approximately ten (10) feet in width for egress and ingress" to
Parcel #3 because it necessarily invites conflict with lTD, as the history ofthis case has
clearly borne out. Skinner's argument therefore results in nothing but the Catch-22
situation that prompted this litigation in the first place. Voiding the illegal portions of
paragraph 5 ofthe 2000 Judgment - whether that be in part or in whole - is the only
means of ensuring that the legal portion of the easement is validated and that the Plane
Trust is not stuck with a landlocked parcel.
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F. Skinner's resort to personal attacks on the Plane Trust is nothing more
than a diversionary tactic that ignores the impossibility of allowing a
landlocked parcel to exist. 17
Last but not least, Skinner actually sees fit to personally attack the Plane Trust
themselves for being dissatisfied with owning a landlocked parcel. Skinner alleges that
the real reason behind this litigation is the Plane Trust's selfish desire to "increase both
the marketability and value of their property." Skinner's Br. at 31. The Trust's "personal
preference" in this regard is asserted to be an improper basis for relief because the Trust
is apparently supposed to be content with relying on a revocable permit from lTD as the
sole means of ingress and egress to their property. Skinner's Br. at 31. Skirmer assures
us that this is not a problem because there is "no evidence that the State will or ever
intends to revoke the permit." [d. Besides, the argument goes, no one can complain
because the parties' predecessors in interest decided to "take their chances" by creating a
partially illegal l8 easement and simply hoping the State would allow everyone to continue
using its right-of-way indefinitely. [d. at 32.

17

This corresponds with Section IX of Skinner's Argument. Skinner's Br. at 30-32.

18 Skinner also pretends to not know what "illegal" means, saying that the Plane Trust uses the
term "throughout their Appellant's Brief without any viable support for the terms use."
Skinner's Br. at 30, n.70. But on that very same page, Skinner quotes the September 27,2012
letter from ITD stating that the parties' "frontage road is illegal" and "must be removed." Id.
Skinner even sought to obtain an encroachment permit from ITD for the specific purpose of
"mak[ing] road access appropriate and legal." R. Vol. II, p. 303. Apparently, then, Skinner
knows what the word "illegal" means when ITD says it, but not when used by the Plane Trust.
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The Court cannot take such sophistry seriously. Beyond being desperate, the
personal attacks against the Plane Trust's desire for a valid and legal easement are just
patently absurd. The Plane Trust's "personal preference" in favor of an easement so
derisively referred to is not only eminently reasonable but in fact the only lawful solution
available in this case. First of all, the Plane Trust does not simply "prefer" that it have an
easement, but already had an easement for the entire width of the driveway expressly
granted to it as the successor in interest to the dominant estate in the 2000 Stipulation. R.
Vol. I, pp. 186-189. The question is therefore not whether the easement exists, but where
it is located. 19
In this regard, the only reasonable construction of the easement language is that
the easement must be located entirely on private land such that the Plane Trust need not
rely on an encroachment permit from lTD to have access to their parcel. As previously
explained, relying on an encroachment permit from lTD as the means of accessing their
There was never any question that it was illegal to attempt to locate an easement over
State right-of-way and Skinner only presently introduces this self-contradictory assertion to serve
as yet another red herring. Thus, in addition to the common law nemo dat rule, Title 40 of the
Idaho Code, and the other "support" put forth for the use of this term by the Plane Trust, ITO's
own regulations make abundantly clear that the driveway here is an illegal encroachment that
must be removed per the September 27,2012 letter. See IDAPA 39.03.42.800.02-.05.
Skinner's statement that the Plane Trust is "unwilling to accept [the 2000 Stipulation and 2000
Judgment] as legally binding," Skinner's Br. at 5, is disingenuous in the extreme- it is ITO that
is unwilling to accept the purported easement across the State right-of-way it regulates, and the
Plane Trust is simply responding to the reality of needing to secure access to its otherwise
landlocked parcel.
19
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property does nothing to solve the problem that motivated this entire course of litigation.
See Opening Br. at 23, n.5. On a practical level, maintaining the status quo does nothing

to prevent Skinner's on-going interference with the driveway and Skinner's insistence
that they are only required to provide some unstated width across the Everton Property,
i.e. Parcel #1,20 and "no more than (than) five feet" across the Wallentine Property, i.e.
Parcel #2 (R. Vol. I, pp. 188, 197),21 while at the same time lTD remains free to revoke
its license and alter the right-of-way, such as by placing a power pole directly in the path
of the disputed area. See R. Supp., pp. 34, 36-38 andR. Vol. II, p. 315.22

20 The words "some unstated width" are used -- because contrary to Skinner's unfounded claim
at page 5 of their Responsive Brie/that such width is "even less" -- there is nothing in the 2000
Stipulation or 2000 Judgment to support such claim.
21 It is relevant to footnote that Skinner (and the District Court) accuses the Plane Trust of
"surgically" changing the easement granted in paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment, when in fact it
is Skinner that should be accused of such activity. Skinner's reliance upon the "five feet"
language in paragraph 5 is self-contradicted by the very sentence to which such limitation is
claimed. The entire sentence states that "No more (than) five of the Wallentine property shall be
used as part of the easement, and only that portion of the WaIIentine property as necessary to
provide ten (10) feet in width shall be used." R. Vol. I, pp. 188, 197. Which is it? The former
part of the sentence conflicts with the latter part of the sentence.
22 Skinner falsely asserts that the "State granted a written permit for the continued use of its right
of way" and that the use of the driveway is now "fully permitted." Skinner's Br. at 30. In fact,
there has never been any approval, past or present, from ITD for anyone to use the impacted
right-of-way for purposes of ingress and egress. ITD itselfhas made clear that its "permit
application shall not permit the illegal frontage road discussed above which must still be removed
immediately." R. Vol. I, p. 220 (emphasis added). Moreover, Skinner's continued interference
with the access afforded by the encroachment permit demonstrates that Skinner is not in
compliance with the permit, thus denying the Plane Trust the exact remedy it purports to afford
them. Compare R. Vol. II, p. 304 (requirements ofITO permit) with R. Supp., pp. 34, 36-38 and
R. Vol. I, pp. 190, 223 (examples of Skinner' s noncompliance).
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On a fundamental legal level, however, an easement has to exist here. It is well
established public policy that courts will not allow a landlocked parcel to exist and will
imply the existence of an easement where necessary. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,
483, 129 P.3d 1223, 1232 (2006) (citing MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1119,
739 P.2d 414,418 (Ct.App.l987». Without a vested property right guaranteeing them
access to their property, the Plane Trust has nothing more than a landlocked parcel.
Thus, the only question here is whether "an easement of approximately ten (10) feet in
width for egress and ingress" to Parcel #3 exists "on the west border of' Parcels # 1 and
#2 by the express grant in paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment (as amended by the Plane's
60(b)(4) motion) or by implication for the reasons stated in Count Two of MacVicar's
amended complaint. See Opening Br. at 31 (citing R. Vol. I, p. 74).
In light of this Court's precedent, the Plane Trust is certainly interested in the
"marketability and value of their property" seeing as a parcel that one can neither access
nor sell is by defmition unmarketable and valueless. Indeed, are there property owners
who would not be "interested" about this problem? No court, including this one, abides
by the "take their chances" approach to property rights advocated by Skinner, and so the
latter's resort to personal attacks against the Plane Trust should be ignored for the
embarrassing distraction that it is.

30

III.

The Plane Trust is entitled to attorney fees on appeal and below.23
Given that Skinner's brief does nothing to rebut the essential violation of the nemo

dat rule described in Section I above, and given that the various claims put forth by
Skinner amount to little more than diversionary tactics and red herrings as described in
Section II above, the Plane Trust reiterates its claim that it is entitled to attorney fees and
costs on appeal and below. See Opening Br. at 40-42.
The Plane Trust does not challenge the amount of attorney fees awarded by the
District Court, Skinner's Br. at 36, although the Plane Trust pointed out at length in its
opening brief that it was an abuse of discretion to award Skinner any fees at all. See
Opening Br. at 37-40.
However, the Plane Trust wholly disagrees with Skinner's assertion that "[t]he
Plane Trust has not disputed any of [the District Court's] fmdings." Skinner's Br. at 34.
The Plane Trust devoted several pages of its opening brief describing the failure of the
District Court to provide any "findings" whatsoever within the context ofLC. § 12-121
and Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 54(e). Opening Br. at 33-36. The District Court described the
various points of black letter law surrounding the award of attorney fees, but then spent
only two sentences actually "applying" these standards to the case at hand - and even
then, only reiterated its conc1usory determination that it was compelled to order the
enforcement of a contract that was admittedly partially illegal. fd. It is absurd of Skinner
23
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to argue that the Plane Trust has not "disputed" the award of attorney fees when this
erroneous sanction forms an explicit and significant basis of the Plane Trust's present
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Skinner (and the District Court) provided no answer to the problem that the
parties' predecessors in interest violated the basic rule that "no one can convey what he
does not own." Instead, Skinner only attempts to divert the Court's focus from this basic
error by crafting a series of misstatements of fact and law and resorting to personal
attacks against the Plane Trust. None of this alters the inevitable conclusion that
paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment and paragraph 6 of the 2000 Stipulation is void to the
extent that it is illegal and therefore cannot be enforced.
The Plane Trust therefore reiterates its request that this Court: void the offending
portion of paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment (thereby granting the Plane Trust's 60(b)( 4)
Motion); reverse the 2013 Decision and the 2014 Decision and its associated 2014
Judgment; grant the Plane Trust attorney fees and costs on appeal; and remand this case
to the District Court to also grant the Plane Trust's attorney fees and costs before the trial
court. Alternatively, should this Court determine that paragraph 5 of the 2000 Judgment
was wholly invalid, it should remand the case to the District Court to consider the relief
originally requested in Count Two of the Amended Complaint by the Plane Trust's
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predecessors-in-interest and othervvise reverse the 2013 Decision and the 2014 Decision
and its associated 2014 Judgment, grant the Plane Trust attorney fees and costs on appeal,
and remand this case to the District Court to also grant the Plane Trust's attorney fees and
costs before the trial cOUli.
Dated this 2nd day of May, 2014.
SCHROEDER & LEZAMIZ LA W OFFICES, LLP

By

~-.-S~~~
W. Alan Schroeder, lawyer for
The Jim & Maryann ane Family Trust dated July 23,2012, AppellantPlaintiff

~~~--...

Bnan iJ.Shcldon, a lawyer for
The Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust dated July 23,2012, AppellantPlaintiff
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